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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the two related questions: convergence of shocks in NMS to their EU 
counterparts through time and the effect of trade integration on distributions of shocks. The 
decision to adopt the euro will be associated with higher implicit costs for new EU member 
states (NMS) with a more asymmetric shock structure. I employ the Kalman filter to calculate 
time varying regression coefficients relating previously identified structural shocks in NMS and 
the EU. Results in general show no convergence for long run shocks identified based on 
Blanchard-Quah restrictions.  Supply and demand shocks do not become increasingly 
symmetric. Results suggest that the catching up process in NMS is slowing down. Additionally, 
there is no strong evidence suggesting that trade integration increased synchronization of 
shocks between the existing EU members and the newcomers. This is true also fro the period 
after joining the union. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper asks whether the economic shocks in Eastern European EU members (NMS)1 
converge towards the shocks in the current members of the European Monetary and Economic 
Union (EMU). Joining the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007, the new members are obliged 
to adopt the common European currency. At the beginning of 2007 the first one (Slovenia) 
adopted the euro, while another (Lithuania) was denied accession due to its failure to meet the 
Maastricht criteria (some details can be found in Table A in the appendix). Moreover, the 
potential costs of joining the EMU have sparked increasing political dissent over the accession 
in several NMS (for example, in Poland and Hungary).  
 
Synchronization of the business cycle is one of the main determinants of the costs for accession 
to a monetary union and is therefore vital for countries about to enter. The optimum currency 
area (OCA) literature focuses on the distribution characteristics of shocks in two distinct 
economic areas to judge the relative costs associated with abandoning an independent 
monetary policy. Highly symmetric shocks in a monetary union and the potential member 
indicate relatively lower costs of joining. Costs are lower since the common monetary authority 
is likely to respond in order to stabilize the effects of the shocks shared by both the monetary 
union and the new member state. In contrast, asymmetric shocks imply high costs of joining a 
monetary union since the new member state will no longer be able to use monetary policy to 
respond to idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, the adjustment mechanism based on a flexible 
exchange rate will no longer be available. Given such shocks, this implies stronger fluctuations 
in output and therefore higher costs of joining a monetary union.  
 
Identified structural vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology has been employed in this 
context to extract structural demand and supply shocks and study their correlation.2 Research 
focusing on convergence of NMS to the EMU yielded an array of contradicting results. In order 
                                                 
1 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
2 The original methodology of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) incorporated the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
approach and was used by Horvath and Ratfai (2004), Frenkel and Nickel (2005), Funke (1997), and others. 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) offer a nice overview. 
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to judge whether NMS shocks converge toward the EU, I follow the approach of Boone (1997),3 
who in turn built on Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), the Kalman (1960) filter to study the 
correlation of structural shocks. Thus, I calculate the time varying regression coefficients that 
relate the shocks in an individual NMS to the corresponding shocks in the EU. Calculated 
standard errors for coefficients facilitate a formal judgment about convergence based on 
statistical criteria. 
 
This paper departs from previous work in several important ways. First, I use the Kalman filter 
to calculate time varying correlations between previously identified structural shocks in the EU 
and in  candidates for membership NMS. Unlike Babetskii et al. (2004), I calculate the standard 
errors for time varying coefficients, which allows for a statistically more rigorous criterion of 
convergence. Third, several authors have pointed to the limited reliability of earlier estimates 
due to the short time series available, which covered the initial structural adjustments in NMS 
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002; Fidrmuc and Korhnonen, 2001). I use the sample from 1993 – 2007 
for NMS. This sample thus excludes transitional recession and therefore some of the structural 
adjustments in these countries. Additionally, the longer sample period is relevant because the 
dynamics of inflation in the studied countries has recently changed, especially in Hungary and 
the Baltic states (almost 7% in Latvia in 2006 and over 9% recently in Hungary). However, I 
expand my analysis comparing it to earlier enlargements of the EU in 1986 and 1995. Fourth, 
previous studies (including Horvath and Ratfai, 2004; Babetskii et al., 2004; Mikek, 2006; and 
others) used the common lag length in specification of all the countries studied, which may 
have affected the results. Therefore, I use statistical criteria to determine the individual lag 
length that is used in estimation for each country. To provide some measure of robustness for 
the results with respect to lag length, I compare the results for a series of possible lag length 
specifications. 
 
Additionally, I investigate two alternative hypothesis about the effect of economic integration 
on the structure of shocks. The first is due to Franker and Rose (1989) and can be summarized 
                                                 
3 Also followed by Babetskii et al. (2004). 
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as follows: more trade mean that the economies of trading partners are becoming more and 
more similar  and therefore experience more and more similar shocks. Alternative is based on 
Krugman (1983) saying that trade facilitates and promotes trade and therefore ever more 
different economic structure of the trading partners. Such trading partners then experience less 
symmetric shocks.  
 
After a brief review of previous research and the theoretical framework in Section 2, I provide 
some details on data and methodology in Section 3. In Section 4I present the long run 
Blanchard Quah restriction and empirical results for shock convergence. Section 5 is devoted to 
investigating the relationship between trade intensity and distribution of shocks. Finally, I 
briefly discuss the findings in Section 6. 
 
2.  Shock symmetry and optimum currency areas  
The seminal paper of Mundell (1961) showed that it is symmetry of shocks that establishes the 
optimal currency area (OCA)4 and is therefore the dominant factor in judging possible 
costs/benefits of entering a monetary union. His original work was extended in several 
directions incorporating the degree of openness (McKinnon, 1963), the importance of product 
diversification and intraindustry trade (Kennen, 1969; Fidrmuc, 2004), the possibility of 
endogeneity in business cycle correlations (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2002), and the relevance of 
political cohesion among members of a monetary union (Ingram, 1996; Goodhart, 1996).  
 
Mundell considered two economic trading areas with distinct currencies. When both areas are 
hit symmetrically with the same shocks, then the adjustment through the exchange mechanism 
is of little need. However, the asymmetric shocks that hit one of the areas but not the other call 
for adjustments through changes in the exchange rate. A flexible exchange rate effectively 
separates both areas and therefore reduces the effect of the shock in one area on the other, 
thereby reducing or even completely eliminating the need for reaction of policy makers to such 
a shock in a partner country.  
                                                 
4 Horvath (2006) is an example of the vast OCA literature overview. 
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Mundell's notion of OCA thus implies that for symmetrically distributed shocks there will be no 
need for an individual country to respond to such shocks and that overall adjustment in the 
monetary union will be sufficient. For idiosyncratic shocks, however, the national monetary 
policy would be called upon to counteract their undesirable effects. But the national monetary 
authority is transferred to a supra-national level in a monetary union and therefore cannot 
respond. Therefore, the lack of an exchange rate adjustment mechanism would be a major 
disadvantage for member countries with asymmetric distribution of shocks. Thus, the 
distribution of shocks across different countries will be a major determinant of the implicit 
costs of their forming a monetary union. 
 
While one strand of empirical literature studying convergence toward a monetary union 
focused on changes in relative prices through the real exchange rate,5 the other approach 
focused on time series behavior of data. A number of papers with a particular focus on time 
series in NMS include, among others, Kocenda et al. (2005), Kutan and Yigit (2004), Brada and 
Kutan (2001), and Kocenda and Valachy (2006). 
 
Measuring the degree of shock symmetry, authors in some earlier studies judged the 
distribution of shocks by studying the correlation of the real output growth or real exchange 
rate.6 Similarly, the Maastricht criteria, which set forth conditions for nominal stability in the 
countries bidding to join the EMU, focus on the outcomes, such as inflation and government 
debt (some details can be found in Table A in the appendix.)7 While nominal stability embedded 
in the criteria is a necessary condition for real stability, it is by no means sufficient.8 Additionally 
                                                 
5 Including DeBroeck and Slok (2001) and DeGrauwe and Vanhalberbeke (1991). 
6 For example, DeGrauwe and Vanhalberbeke (1991) or Cohen and Wyplosz (1989).  
7 Although in principle the criteria are not compatible with the catching up process in NMS (since productivity 
shocks may contribute to inflation rates higher than in the EU), empirical estimates render magnitudes consistent 
with fulfilling the criteria (e.g., Kovacs, 2002).  
8 Nominal stability depends on fiscal policy (Mikek, 2006a). While small NMS show impressive fiscal outcomes, 
the large NMS showed hefty increases in debt during the 2002-2005 period (Poland 19%, Czech Republic 37%, and 
Hungary 58%). The numbers may even be underestimated (Kopits and Székely, 2003; Halpern and Nemenyi, 2001). 
Increasing political dissent over fiscal discipline further exacerbates the situation. Lewis (2007) finds exchange rate 
regime to be a determinant of fiscal performance. 
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and more importantly, the focus on outcomes fails to distinguish between the shocks 
themselves and the adjustment to these shocks. Therefore, based on the outcomes that reflect 
both the shocks and reaction to them, one cannot separate the shocks from the policy 
measures taken in response to them. However, the shocks identified in a Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) allow for separating the shocks themselves from the outcomes.  
 
The SVAR approach by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), which studies the correlation of 
identified demand and supply shocks, was applied to NMS by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), 
Horvath and Ratfai (2004), Frenkel and Nickel (2005), Mikek (2006), and Gilson (2006) among 
others. Their results on symmetry of shocks vary substantially. For example, while Horvath and 
Ratfai find a high level of symmetry, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) and Frenkel and Nickel 
(2005) conclude the opposite. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006), Mikek (2006), and Horvath and 
Ratfai (2004) all report relatively low correlation coefficients for shocks between NMS and the 
EU. Low correlations are likely due to the noise in quarterly data, and several authors claim that 
these are of comparable magnitude to those within the EU.9  
 
Additionally, studies of shock correlation dynamics through time also show mixed results. Artis 
et al. (2004) and Darvas and Szapary (2005) find that correlations for some countries increase 
through time while they decrease for others. Mikek (2006) uses two sub-periods and in general 
cannot reject the null of unchanged correlations over the two sub-periods. However, Babetskii 
et al. (2004) find that "supply shocks are not converging" and that "…demand shocks are 
becoming increasingly synchronized with the EU countries …" The literature thus suggests very 
mixed results.  
 
The possibility of endogeneity of the shocks has been studied by Frankel and Rose (1989), 
Krugman (1983), Kennen (2001), Babetskii (2005), Fidermuc (2004) and others. Frankel and 
Rose (1898) suggested that trading partners with stronger trade ties are becoming gradually 
more similar and therefore experience more similar shocks. Fur such countries the costs of 
                                                 
9 For example, Fidrmuc and Korhonnen (2006), Frenkel and Nickel (2006), and Gilson (2006). 
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joining a monetary union would be smaller. Alternatively, Krugman's (1983) take on this was 
just the opposite. Trade encourages specialization and therefore the trading partners are 
becoming increasingly less similar. Thus, that are bound to experience less symmetric shocks. 
Kennen (2001) suggested that it actually depends on the nature of shocks. While Fidrmuc 
(2005) avoided the problems of endogeneity of shocks by studying intra industry trade, 
Babetskii (2005) studies NMS and find some evidence supporting the Frankel and Rose's view. 
 
In what follows,  I use Blanchard Quah type long run restriction to identify shocks and calculate 
time varying correlations  with the Kalman filter to assess the convergence of candidate 
countries (NMS and earlier newcomers) to the EU on the extended data set. Additionally, I 
expand on Babetskii et al. (2004) by studying the robustness of the results to alternative lag 
specifications and calculate standard errors to provide a statistical criterion in judging possible 
convergence. Finally I present some evidence on the endogeneity of shocks.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
The methodology for the present study consists of three steps. First, the shocks are recovered 
from a structural vector autoregression. Second, the series of these shocks is used to calculate 
time varying correlations by employing the Kalman filter. Third, the series of the time varying 
regression coefficients and the associated standard errors are studied to make a judgment on 
their possible convergence through time. 
 
First, I follow the methodology of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and consider a two variable 
SVAR (inflation and output growth): 
ti
i
i
t uALX 


0
     (1) 
where Xt' =[yt, πt] includes real output growth (y) and inflation rate (π) and ut'=[ust, udt] includes 
an output growth shock (us) and  an inflation shock (ud), A is a compatible matrix of parameters 
and L is the lag operator. The equation is thus an infinite moving average representation of a 
VAR, and the shocks (u) are unobservable structural shocks. The variance covariance matrix of 
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structural shocks is: E(UU') = Ω. For a given specified lag, the estimation of model (1) renders 
the vector of residuals et and the estimated variance covariance matrix: E(ee') = Σ. The 
variance/covariance matrices are related as follows: 
 
Σ  =  A0 Ω A0'                   (2) 
 
Thus I need four restrictions to recover the unobservable structural shocks. They will be based 
on Blanchard Quah (1989) long run restriction. Three restrictions are the same for both 
identifications.  Two are normalizations of variances and the third one follows from the 
assumption of orthogonal shocks. This implies:10 
Σ  =  A0  A0'                        (3) 
The fourth restriction requires the following : 
   
0
0
12 
i
ia       (4) 
This assumption identifies the supply shocks with permanent effects on both output and 
inflation dynamics and only transitory effects of demand shocks. The structural shocks can be 
recovered directly from the reduced form VAR parameters as follows: 
tt uAe 0        (5) 
The vector of estimated residuals et is a linear combination of underlying structural shocks. I 
collect the structural shocks ut from this estimation and use them to study their correlation 
through time.  
 
Second, after the structural shocks are extracted, I calculate time varying correlations between 
shocks in the EU and in NMS using the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). Consider the following 
equation, which relates shocks in NMS, the EU, and the rest of the world (Boone, 1997):  
 
UNMS,i - UEU =  a(t) + b(t) (UUS - UEU) + e          (6) 
                                                 
10 As noted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). 
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The vector of output and inflation shocks (or supply and demand shocks for BQ identification) 
recovered from VARs above U=[us, ud] has index 'EU' for European, 'US' for American, and 
'NMS,i' for shocks in individual NMS. Vector e=[es, ed] contains random residuals. This is the 
measurement equation for the Kalman filter.11 The equation explains the shock in NMS, which 
is in excess of the reference EU shock (left hand side of the equation), in terms of the rest of the 
world shock (US), which is in excess of the EU shock and a constant (measuring a possible 
persistent difference between EU and NMS shocks). In general, however, coefficient a should 
be zero by construction since all shocks have zero mean (Boone, 1997).  I estimate equation (6), 
which has time dependent coefficients, for both output and inflation (or for BQ identification 
supply and demand) shocks in both regions. Unlike Mikek (2006), who split the sample into two 
subsamples and tested whether the correlations have changed, the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960 
or Hamilton, 1994). The latter is superior to splitting the sample since it can trace out the 
dynamics through time and does not require identifying/choosing a break point. The Kalman 
filter calls for additional assumptions about the coefficients (unobservable states). I assume 
they follow random walk, with ψi being white noise, giving the following transition equations:  
                          a(t) = a(t-1) + ψ0(t)                  
b(t) = b(t-1) + ψ1(t)                     (7) 
The approach can incorporate the possibility of endogenous correlations of inflation shocks (or 
demand shocks for BQ identification) due to increasing monetary integration: correlations 
between the EU and NMS shocks would be increasing and therefore the corresponding 
coefficients a(t) and b(t) would be decreasing through time. 
 
Third, I define the convergence in the following way: Unlike previous studies (e.g. Babetskii et 
al., 2004), I use statistical criteria to judge the convergence and for that purpose calculate the 
standard errors of the time varying coefficients. Controlling for the rest of the world, a(t)  in 
equation (6) above approaching zero suggests convergence of the NMS shocks to their 
European counterparts. Similarly, given a(t),  b(t) approaching 0 indicates progressively less 
important "rest of the world" and therefore convergence. However, in addition to the general 
                                                 
11 Further details can be found, for example, in Hamilton (1994) or Kalman (1962).  
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direction of the coefficients through time, I formally test the hypotheses H0: a(f)=0  and H0: 
b(f)=0, where a(f) and b(f) are the regression coefficients in the final state.  
 
This study includes NMS: (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) and countries joining the EU earlier (Portugal, Spain, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden). Additionally, the reference countries were the US and the three largest 
EU economies (Germany, France, and Italy). Thus, the EU variables were calculated as average 
growth rates for Germany, France and Italy,12 which represented about 52% of the EU GDP in 
2005. The data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The quarterly data 
sample covers 1993q1 to 2007q1 for most countries. However, for Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Slovenia, the available data started in 1995q1 and for Romania in 1998q1. While 
data for the large EU countries and the US were seasonally adjusted, the NMS data were not 
and therefore seasonal variables were included in VARs for NMS.  
 
I measure output using real GDP and price level by GDP deflator. Several authors have worked 
with CPI instead. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) report that the studies using CPI tend to find 
higher correlation coefficients for shocks in the two regions and therefore claim stronger 
convergence of NMS to EU shocks than those based on the deflator. Similarly, Gilson (2006), 
using CPI, finds relatively high correlation coefficients for both output and inflation shocks. 
However, the CPI includes the prices of goods consumed in home countries (including those 
imported) and in that sense directly transmits foreign price shocks or exchange rate shocks into 
the home economy. Since all of the NMS and the earlier newcomers are very open economies, 
the results based on CPI are likely to show shocks originating abroad. This would be particularly 
true for the NMS with consumption baskets looking increasingly like those in the EU. 
Admittedly, the approach here cannot distinguish between the shocks originating in the home 
economy or abroad; however, the systematic incorporation of foreign shocks, such as through 
the CPI, is much less likely.  
 
                                                 
12 Similar to Frenkel and Nickel (2005), Funke (1997), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and others. 
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Different from previous work, the lag length in each VAR for an individual country was 
determined based on statistical criteria. Each VAR was thus estimated with an individually 
determined lag length. The following 4 criteria were used: the sequential exclusion likelihood 
ratio test at the 5% level (LR), final prediction error (FPE), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). The final number of lags chosen corresponds 
to the most frequently chosen lag length by these statistical tests. Additionally, I checked for 
robustness of the results with respect to alternative specifications of the lag length for NMS and 
calculated the coefficients through time for lags between 2 and 8. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Increasingly, more similar results in the outcomes between NMS and the EU have been widely 
documented (e.g., Mikek, 2006; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006). However, the distinction 
between convergence in outcomes and convergence in shocks is conceptually important. 
Focusing on outcomes cannot distinguish between shocks and reactions to those shocks. While 
several elements in the country specific propagation mechanisms originate from policy actions, 
the shocks are exogenous. Thus, they are relatively more difficult to eliminate than the 
adjustments in policy and may pose more serious potential costs. For example: the adjustment 
based on country specific monetary policy or exchange rates disappears in a monetary union, 
thus the propagation mechanisms across the studied countries will become more similar as 
they join the monetary union. As such the propagation mechanism is relatively less important13 
and I focus on identifying the underlying shocks. The increasingly similar outcomes mentioned 
above are compatible with two possible scenarios: either the underlying shocks are highly 
positively correlated and the propagation mechanism is already very similar across the 
countries, or alternatively the shocks are independent and the country specific propagation 
mechanisms are such as to produce similar outcomes. The studied countries display many 
idiosyncratic characteristics, as is confirmed by the results below, and therefore assuming 
highly correlated shocks a priori does not seem warranted.   
 
                                                 
13 And its thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Therefore, ever more similar outcomes do not reveal the implied costs of giving up monetary 
independence. Instead, they hide the fact that the economy with asymmetric shocks has higher 
adjustment costs to process the different shocks in a way that produces more similar outcomes. 
Thus, while the shocks push the outcomes in the same direction, the outcomes do not depend 
solely on the shocks. It is both the shocks and the adjustment mechanisms in the economy that 
determine final outcomes.  
 
I conceptualize convergence in terms of the dynamics and final state of the coefficients a(t) and 
b(t) in equation (6) above. Convergence will reject the null for the final value at 5% significance. 
Thus, controlling for the rest of the world and given a(t), b(t) approaching zero would indicate 
that NMS shocks are increasingly approaching those of the EU, as opposed to the rest of the 
world. Literature with a wide spectrum of results as discussed above offers little guidance as to 
what may be expected.  
 
 
Blanchard Quah identification: demand and supply shocks  
The output and inflation shocks studied above may be due to major shifts in demand or supply. 
However, demand shocks may depend on monetary policy and therefore may disappear after a 
country joins the monetary union. At the same time, they could serve as a rough signal of 
alignment in monetary policy for individual NMS with that of the European central bank (ECB). 
On the other hand, supply shocks depend on productivity changes and are likely to persist after 
accession to the EMU. Thus, their asymmetry is likely to be a major ingredient in the implied 
costs of joining the EMU. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between these two types of 
shocks. I use the Blanchard-Quah identification scheme, which is based on the assumption that 
demand shocks have no long run effect on supply, but supply shocks have a lasting effect on 
demand (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992). As before, I estimate equation (6) with the Kalman 
filter14 for both demand and supply shocks separately. 
 
                                                 
14 While the Kalman filter  allows for direct comparison with earlier work (Babetskii et al., 2004).  
 13
The dynamics of coefficients merit closer inspection using Figure 2 and 3 below, which shows 
the coefficient b(t) through time and thus makes the dynamics much more clear. For most 
countries the b(t) for supply shocks show similar very dynamics: Substantial gains before 2001 
and only very limited decreases or even increases (for Lithuania or Bulgaria) after 2001. This 
seems to suggest slower catching up in productivity in NMS. b(t) coefficients for demand shocks 
separate countries into two groups: those with seemingly converging coefficients (such as 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and those with either increasing or unclear dynamics (including 
Estonia and  Czech Republic).  Figure 3 shows dynamics of b(t0 for the earlier newcomers prior 
to their entry in the EU. For Spain and Portugal we cannot reject the null for the final value and 
for both supply and demand shocks. Similarly the dynamics for Sweden 's supply shocks is 
favorable. However, final values for Austria, Finland and Sweden for demand shocks clearly 
reject the null and thus indicate relatively higher potential costs of joining a monetary union. 
However, these countries had a longer period of adjustment before the introduction of euro 
and therefore their situation is not completely comparable to that in NMS with regard to 
potential costs of joining a monetary union.  
 14
Figure 2: Dynamics of b(t) coefficients through time estimated by Kalmn fileter and based on 
the Blanchard-Quah restriction15
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15 Country abbreviations are:  pt – Portugal, sp – Spain, at – Austria, fi – Finland, sw – Sweden, cz- Czech Republic, 
es –Estonia, hu – Hungary, la – Latvia, li – Lithuania, po- Poland, si – Slovenia, sk – Slovakia, bu – Bulgaria and ro 
– Romania.  
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Figure 3: Dynamics of b(t) coefficients through time estimated by Kalman filter and based on the Blanchard-Quah restriction 
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A comparison of coefficients b(t)  with Portugal and Spain prior to EU entry16 reveals that, in 
general, the countries studied here have similar magnitudes for both shocks. Most exhibit a 
comparable mean of b(t) for supply shock . While this points toward similar costs of 
adjustments after accession, they are misleading. Spain and Portugal did not need to go 
through the final stages of transition to a market economy at the time of entry and they already 
had economic systems more compatible with the EU. On the contrary, NMS are both 
transforming their economic system and working on joining the EU. (While the results suggest 
substantial progress towards this goal, the process is not complete.) 
 
While many previous papers imposed a uniform structure of lags on different countries (for 
example, Horvath and Ratfai, 2004 and Gilson, 2006 impose two lags for all countries), I use 
statistical criteria to specify the lags for individual countries. In particular, the joint null 
hypothesis of zero coefficients at given lag (t-l) is tested sequentially - H0: βi,t-l = βj,t-l = 0 for l = 8 
,7, …,1. The test results for lag exclusion are given in Table B in the appendix. However, 
Babetskii (2005) points out the low robustness of the estimated correlations for shocks in 
various studies, despite the same methodology. To address this, I check for robustness of the 
results to alternative lag specifications. I calculated the series of the b(t) coefficients for BQ 
specification and the Kalman filter for l = 2, …,8. The results are given in Figure A in the 
appendix and illustrate two points: first, they show relatively weak sensitivity to the lag choice 
for individual countries (as long as more than 3 lags are included); and second, there is no 
justification for imposing a uniform lag structure across countries (especially if this includes only 
a few lags). This is clearly visible on the graphs for Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic.  
 
Has the symmetry of shocks in NMS increased within the group (Horvath and Ratfai, 2004)? In 
order to answer this question, I estimated the following:17 
UNMS,i = a(t) +b(t) * Uavg     (8) 
                                                 
16 As reported in Babetskii et al. (2004). 
17 In fact, I investigated several alternative specifications to control for EU shocks and for shocks in the rest of the 
world (US).  
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U=[us, ud] is a vector of structural supply and demand shocks. Index 'NMS' indicates individual 
NMS and 'avg' marks the average for NMS. The coefficients a(t) and b(t) follow an AR(1) process 
given in equation (7) above. Convergence in this setting would require a(t) approaching zero 
and b(t) approaching 1. However, similar to Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003), I find that none of 
the countries displayed this tendency for either demand or for supply shocks.18 The demand 
shocks may be induced by policy, such as a disinflation program. However, despite disinflation 
programs in these countries, there seems to be no synchronization of demand shocks, which is 
probably due to different timing of disinflation. This suggests that the NMS have not been 
experiencing similar shocks, and it implies that we should not treat the group as homogeneous. 
Indeed, differences between individual NMS countries are substantial.  
5. Does trade matter? 
Figures 4 to 6 below show scatterplots between trade intensity and the b(t) coefficients. Trade 
intensity (Frankel and Rose, 1989) is calculated as 
TI = (EX+IM) / (WEX+WIM)+(EUWEX+EUWIM) 
Where TI – trade intensity, EX – exports of a country to EU, IM – imports from the EU, WEX – 
total exports of a country, WIM – total imports for the country, EUWEX – total exports of the 
EU and EUWIM total imports of the EU. Thus it is a share of bilateral trade in the sum of total 
trade for both partners. 
 
Figure 4 limits its time span to several years prior to the EU entry. While trade seems to have 
increased the symmetry of supply shocks before entry for the earlier newcomers there is no 
evidence that that is in general true for the NMS (Slovakia and Bolgaria seem to be exceptions). 
Also demand shocks show that higher trade intensity is associated in most cases with less shock 
symmetry. This is true for most NMS and even for a couple of the earlier newcomers (Finland 
and Sweden). Thus scatterplots do not offer much of unified picture for the relationship 
between trade and symmetry of the shocks. Perhaps one may dare to claim that the earlier 
newcomers had in general slightly more favorable relationship in this respect, however the 
sample is so small that even this should be taken with caution.  
                                                 
18 To save space these results are not displayed here.  
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Figure 6 below shows the scatter graphs for the earlier newcomers for the period after their 
entry to the EU. While graphs may be less convincing than numbers the clear picture is clearly 
not there. While demand shocks for Portugal and Spain are decreasing (indicating that trade 
integration was associated with more symmetric shocks) we see just the opposite for Spainsh 
supply shocks and Finish demand shocks.  
 
One can draw similar conclusion from Table A and B in the appendix. Negative coefficient would 
indicate that more trade mean more symmetry shocks (smaller b(t)). However, Swedish 
coefficient for demand shocks is the only significant negative coefficient. This means that 
Frankel and Rose (1989) hypothesis is not supported by the findings here. This is true for both 
the period prior to the EU entry with intensive preparation in the new countries, including 
adjustments in institutional environment, and after they joined the club. Even after joining the 
EU the symmetry of shocks did not reflect the trade integration in the sense of Frankel and 
Rose. Instead it seems that Krugman's conjecture about stronger specialization and more  
asymmetric shocks was equally likely. 
 
This is further confirmed by table 1 below.  It shows the results of a panel estimation, where I 
combined the shocks and trade intensities across countries. While for the period before entry 
to the EU the coefficient for supply is significant it is positive for the supply shock. Additionally, 
adding the time trend renders it insignificant. In the third row are the results where I added a 
dummy variable to indicate the period after the entry.  For both demand and supply shocks the 
dummy variable coefficient is not significant and tiny. Thus there was no significant change 
between periods prior and after the EU entry for the earlier newcomers.  
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Table 1: Symmetry of shocks as dependent on trade intensity 
 
 GD    DE    
 beta t value Time/dummy t value beta t value Time/dummy t value 
Prior  0.226180  4.298182   -0.174586 -2.099880   
Prior time  0.055932  0.858202 -0.005716 -4.221990 -0.035134 -0.333971  0.004682  2.142496 
Whole 
period 0.054815 1.893547 -1.35E-16 -3.51E-15 -0.041916 4.481919 -1.35E-16 -3.20E-15 
         
 
 
6. Discussion  
The results here are different from previous studies (e.g., Horvath and Ratfai, 2004; Babetskii,  
2004), which found convergence for demand. However, like previous research, I find no 
evidence of convergence for supply shocks.  
 
First, the Kalman filter reveals that the coefficients are not approaching zero through time. 
Trends are extremely weak and final values for supply shocks are between 0.28 and 0.58. This 
suggests that the supply shocks in NMS are in general not similar to their European 
counterparts. The asymmetric supply shocks are not surprising and have been widely 
documented (e.g. Horvath and Ratfai, 2004: Frenkel and Nickel, 2005). The asymmetry in supply 
shocks arises from the dynamic restructuring of institutional framework and productivity shocks 
induced by the catching up process in NMS.  
 
Second, the results indicate that, while still present, the catching up in productivity is slowing 
down, as can be seen in rather stable coefficients for supply towards the end of the studied 
period (the first two rows in Figures 1 and 2 above) and in small trend coefficients. In other 
words, the NMS have in general almost caught up with the rest of the EU in terms of 
productivity. Nevertheless, approaching a non zero value indicates that the supply shocks 
remain rather asymmetric. This may be due to institutional framework, market structures or 
other remaining idiosyncratic rigidities in individual NMS. Furthermore, it seems that NMS 
process shocks from the rest of the world differently from the current EMU members. 
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Third, the results for demand shocks here are in contrast with previous findings of convergence. 
Different from previous studies (e.g. Horvath and Ratfai, 2004 or Babetskii et al., 2004), in 
general I found no convergence for demand shocks in NMS, including, for example, the Czech 
Republic or Estonia. The dynamics of the coefficient b(t) for demand shocks in Czech Republic is 
a surprise since inflation was quite low during the observed period. However, as mentioned 
above, the dynamics of inflation (outcome) are not determined solely by the shocks, but also by 
the way the economic system processes these shocks. Thus, the results suggest relatively high 
costs of adjusting to the shocks in Czech Republic. In contrast, the dynamics for Hungary are not 
a surprise since inflation in Hungary recently increased substantially. It would require 
information beyond the sample studied here to sort out whether the recent inflation in 
Hungary, as high as 9%, is due to changing demand shocks or some other factor. Hungary and 
Poland are especially interesting cases. Despite the lack of political consensus on joining the 
EMU, coefficients in both countries decrease over some portion of the observed period. 
However, while Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia show somewhat stronger dynamics towards 
more symmetric demand shocks, they still fail the test of zero null. The results thus suggest that 
NMS in general do not exhibit a pattern of synchronized demand shocks. Additionally, further 
work on individual countries (not as a group) is needed to better understand the dynamics of 
the demand shocks. 
 
Fourth, while the results are relatively robust to the choice of lag length as long as sufficiently 
many are included (check Figure B in the appendix), they may not be robust with respect to the 
time period studied and the data source. Several authors (including Campos and Coricelli, 2002 
and Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003) cautioned that some earlier studies are less reliable since 
they included transitional recession. The sample used here excludes the early stages of 
transition before 1993/1994, which was characterized by abrupt, large structural adjustments 
in NMS. These likely contributed to larger demand shocks (both directly and through the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect) and therefore played a role in identifying stronger convergence than 
found here. Besides excluding the transitional recession, the sample covers recent years and 
therefore captures the new dynamics in output and particularly inflation after 2002 (e.g., in 
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Estonia, Latvia or Hungary). Differences across the observed periods may also stem from 
various other factors, such as different policies in place (for example, disinflation efforts) or 
increasingly similar consumption preferences due to high trade integration between the 
economies (Frankel and Rose, 1996). 
 
Fifth, the diverging results for demand shocks might be partly due to shocks originating in 
monetary policy itself. If that is the case, giving up monetary authority would eliminate those 
shocks. In contrast, diverging supply shocks indicate relatively high costs of joining the EMU as 
these would persist in a monetary union. Babetskii et al. (2004) found that Spain and Portugal 
also had diverging supply shocks up to the time of their entry to the EU. They point out that a 
higher level of integration in capital markets allows for better diversification of asset portfolios 
to handle idiosyncratic risks. However, divergent supply shocks are likely to render a common 
monetary policy not optimal for at least some members of the monetary union and would 
certainly increase the cost of entering such a union.19  
 
Sixth, two offsetting factors may have contributed to the dynamics of coefficients seen above 
during ever stronger integration of NMS and the EU. Frankel and Rose (1996) point out that 
coordination of policy decreases uncertainty and promotes trade and foreign direct investment, 
which in turn increases covariance of country-specific supply shocks through spreading 
productivity adjustments. This would explain the dynamics of coefficients in the earlier part of 
the observed period, characterized by a dynamic catching up process. In contrast, higher trade 
integration promotes more specialization and therefore less synchronization of supply shocks 
(Krugman, 1993). Since it offsets the productivity spreading effect, this seems to be compatible 
with relatively little change in the supply shock coefficients in the second part of the sample. 
Thus, while productivity spreading was dominant in the past, specialization seems to have 
                                                 
19 In fact, it may even be undesirable for the union itself since it complicates monetary policy, creating a trade-off 
for the central bank in the sense of Clarida et al. (2000). 
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gained momentum in recent years.  The latter mitigates productivity spreading and is thus 
compatible with little change in the coefficients observed.20   
 
Seventh, studying the effect of trade integration on the symmetry of shocks did not provide 
support for either of alternative possible explanations. Neither the Frankel and Rose suggestion 
nor Krugman's claims were supported by the data. This casts doubt on the findings of Babetskii 
(2005) for NMS. There may be several reasons for this. One may be that further diaggregation 
of shocks would be needed. Alternatively, the evidence that NMS have strong idiosyncratic 
economic structures and dynamics might have played the role. However, I am inclined to think 
that both effects are clearly there and they are balanced in a way that prevents their easy 
detection in data. Previous studies based their reasoning on the outcomes and interpreted the 
synchronization in GDP or inflation as the consequence of stronger trade ties. However, as 
discussed above the outcomes incorporate both the shocks and the adjustment mechanism. 
Therefore it seems that some further analysis of the adjustment mechanism might reveal more 
about the relationship. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The costs of giving up the ability to respond to idiosyncratic shocks through monetary policy 
could be very high. The magnitude depends on the degree of symmetry in distribution of shocks 
in the monetary union and the individual country. For countries with an asymmetric shock 
structure with respect to the EMU (such as Estonia or Czech Republic), keeping flexible 
exchange rates a little longer would be most beneficial. They at least partially isolate their 
economies in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, these countries would not find a common 
monetary policy a welcome stabilization instrument since the costs of joining the EMU are likely 
to be substantial.21 In line with this, Angeloni et al. (2007) find that the exchange rate regime 
affects the speed of convergence and therefore conclude that "exchange rate flexibility may 
                                                 
20 This is not at odds with the claim of slowing down the productivity catching up process since trade integration of 
the NMS is also likely to be slowing down. 
21 Sanchez (2006) finds countries with flatter output-inflation tradeoff and larger country size would show a 
preference for a flexible exchange rate. 
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still serve as a useful shock absorber." Moreover, Lewis (2006) reports that the exchange rate 
regime is the most important determinant of fiscal outcomes in NMS. This confirms that NMS 
trying to stabilize the exchange rate are actually using their fiscal policy to respond to 
idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, this already reveals some hidden costs of giving up monetary 
independence (in the form of participation in ERM2, currency board or other non-flexible 
exchange rate arrangement). Most of the NMS have implemented either inflation targeting, 
currency board, or some other formal mechanism to prepare for EMU entry. However, if they 
experience asymmetric shocks, as suggested by the results above, the costs of their entry might 
be relatively high.  
 
To summarize, different from previous studies, my results show no evidence of convergence for 
either demand or supply shocks in NMS. Formally testing the null for final values and time 
trends for both alternative estimation methods and both identification schemes, results seem 
to suggest rather asymmetric shocks. Coefficients b(t) approaching a non zero value indicate 
that NMS respond to the shocks from the rest of the world in a different way from their EU 
counterparts. Relatively stable coefficients toward the end of the observed period for supply 
shocks indicate that the dynamic process of productivity shocks due to catching up in NMS has 
been slowing down. Additionally, the NMS as a group have not been experiencing increasingly 
similar shocks. In fact, the countries are rather different and therefore cannot be treated as a 
homogenous group. This calls for further inquiry into (primarily demand) shocks for individual 
countries. The distinction between convergence in outcomes and convergence in shocks 
becomes obvious for several countries (such as Czech Republic or Estonia), where we see 
divergence in shocks and some convergence of outcomes. This implies relatively high costs of 
processing shocks for such economies in order to produce outcomes similar to those in the EU. 
The dynamics of coefficients in the earlier part of the observed period were primarily in line 
with the productivity spreading explanation of Frankel and Rose (1996). However, in recent 
years specialization due to high trade integration (Krugman, 1993) with the EU most likely 
mitigated this influence and contributed to relatively stable coefficients. 
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Current results suggest the need for further analysis in three directions: first, exploring the 
sources of (primarily) demand shocks focusing on individual NMS (establishing additional 
robustness tests for the present results); second, studying causes of asymmetries focusing on 
the propagation mechanism in individual NMS; and third, confronting alternative possible 
explanations and determining the level of possible endogeneity in shock distribution due to 
integration. Further research is likely to be fruitful as the longer time series become available 
and the transition towards fully fledged market economies is nearing its completion in NMS.  I 
found no clear support for either of alternative hypothesis explaining the relationship between 
trade intensity and symmetry of the shocks. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Maastricht values for NMS in 2006 
 Inflation Interest rate Government deficit Public debt 
Czech Republic  2.2 3.8 -3.5 30.9 
Slovakia 4.3 4.3 -3.4 33.0 
Poland 1.2 5.2 -2.2 42.4 
Hungary 3.5 7.1 -10.1 67.6 
Slovenia 2.5 3.8 -1.8 29.9 
Estonia 4.3 n.a. 2.5 4.0 
Latvia 6.7 3.9 -1.0 11.1 
Lithuania 3.7 4.0 -0.5 18.9 
Reference value 2.8 6.2 3.0 60.0 
Source: Convergence report (2006) values for Slovenia and Lithuania are from EUROSTAT (2007) and the 
Convergence report (2006a). Only Poland and Slovenia met the criteria in 2006. The latter successfully adopted the 
euro in January 2007. 
Table B:  Relationship between symmetry of the shocks and trade intensity (b(t)= f(IT)) prior to 
EU entry 
 Supply    Demand    
 beta t value time t value beta t value time t value 
PT  0.5907  0.7128  0.0063  0.9915  0.0139  0.0063 -0.0208 -1.2145 
SP  0.0223  0.0549  0.0082  1.2058  0.2107  0.1752  0.0421  2.0936 
AT  0.4324  1.3206  0.0169  5.1837  0.3667  1.4717  0.0150  6.0267 
FI -0.6303 -1.3799 -0.0170 -2.8852 -0.5966 -1.9192  0.0103  2.5748 
SW  0.0805  0.1995 -0.0267 -6.5650 -0.5180 -3.5859  0.0065  4.4957 
CZ  0.2075  0.3744 -0.0206 -1.7821 -0.1009 -0.2599 -0.0028 -0.3505 
HU -0.2232 -0.2938 -0.0100 -1.3572  0.7202  1.1263 -0.0101 -1.6260 
PO  0.4940  1.2987 -0.0139 -2.6889 -0.1791 -0.4938 -0.0021 -0.4264 
SK  0.0087  0.1446  0.0016  0.8215  0.2690  4.0326 -0.0013 -0.5984 
ES -0.1974 -1.0826 -0.0054 -0.7944 -0.1542 -1.9950  0.0220  7.6957 
LA -0.0999 -1.1968 -0.0116 -4.6027  0.0477  0.7925 -0.0078 -4.2820 
LI  0.5947  1.3730 -0.0369 -2.3875  0.0822  0.6549 -0.0032 -0.7092 
SI  0.1388  0.4401 -0.0131 -5.6478 -0.0131 -0.0541 -0.0083 -4.6306 
BU  0.1248  3.6573  0.0000  0.0259  0.0511  0.3796  0.0053  2.6320 
RO -0.3081 -1.3035  0.0016  0.4630  0.5816  1.0984  0.0064  0.8267 
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Table C:  Relationship between symmetry of the shocks  and trade intensity (b(t)= f(IT)) since to 
EU entry 
 
 Supply    Demand    
 beta t value time t value beta t value time t value 
PT  0.2827  2.4775 -0.0052 -7.0982  0.2286  5.0678  0.0024  8.3371 
SP -0.0486 -0.1182 -0.0093 -2.7441  0.5915  5.7141 -0.0024 -2.7872 
AT  0.4952  2.8252 -0.0018 -3.3905  0.3286  3.4615 -0.0012 -4.3170 
FI  1.5003  4.0116 -0.0067 -4.3850  0.0141  0.3217 -0.0022 -12.4423 
SW  0.3715  0.8700 -0.0119 -6.6796  0.0086  0.1155 -0.0004 -1.3379 
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Figure A: Robustness of the results with respect to chosen lag length 
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The numbers on selected graphs indicate number of lags included in estimation of the particular series of b(t) coefficients. In general, the series are not very 
sensitive to specification of lags as long as at least 4 lags are included. The graphs here are based on the Kalman filter and Blanchard-Quah long run restriction. 
